

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-11

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 SAJ-01 CU-05 ACDA-19 TRSE-00 SAM-01 DRC-01

/142 W

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R 111422Z SEP 74

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8186

INFO/ALL CSCE CAPS 184

AMEMBASSY OSLO

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USLO SACLANT NORFOLK VA

USDOCSOUTH

CINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 5745

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM

SUBJECT: CSCE: CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

1. SUMMARY: AT OPENING SESSION OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY SECURITY ON SEPTEMBER 10, THERE WAS LENGTHY BUT UNPRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THRESHOLD FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS. SOVIET AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH DOMINATED MEETING BY REPEATING WELL-KNOWN VIEWS THAT CBMS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITH GREAT CAUTION SINCE THEY ARE UNIQUE MEASURES WHICH REQUIRE TESTING. MENDELEVICH UNDERLINED THAT THE WHOLE CBM EXERCISE WAS FULL OF RISKS FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS, BUT SUGGESTED THAT AGREEMENT ON INITIAL MEASURES WITH CONCRETE PARAMETERS COULD BE REACHED PROVIDED ALL SIDES HAD THE WILL TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHERS POSITIONS. END SUMMARY.

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2. AFTER AGREEING TO A WORK PROGRAM FOR THE NEXT TWO WEEKS, SUBCOMMITTEE STARTED OFF WITH NEW READING OF DOCUMENT CSCE/II/C/103 ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS. DISCUSSION TURNED QUICKLY TO THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH TAKING LEAD TO ATTACK WESTERN POSITION. MENDELEVICH WONDERED WHAT THE MOTIVE WAS FOR PROPOSING A LEVEL OF ONE DIVISION OR ONE REINFORCED DIVISION AS THE THRESHOLD FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION. IN DOING SO HE POSED THREE QUESTIONS: (1) COULD THE MANEUVERS OF ONE DIVISION IN A BORDER AREA CAUSE DISQUIET; (2) HAS THERE BEEN A CASE OF AN ATTACK BY ONE DIVISION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY; AND (3) WOULD SUCH NOTIFICATION AT THIS LEVEL OVER A PERIOD OF TIME REVEAL A NEIGHBORS WAR PREPARATION PLANS. ALL THESE QUESTIONS WERE PERTINENT TO THE DISCUSSION AND REQUIRED ANSWERS, MENDELEVICH SAID.

3. REPLIES CAME FROM MALTA, CANADA, BELGIUM, GREECE, UK AND FRG WITH MALTA PLEADING THE CASE FOR NOTIFICATION AT A LOWER SCALE AND OTHERS ATTEMPTING REPLIES TO THE THREE SOVIET QUESTIONS.

4. MENDELEVICH BRUSHED ASIDE ALL REPLIES AND OUTLINED AT LENGTH SOVIET PHILOSOPHY ON CBMS. HE SAID THE PROBLEMS OF MALTA COULD BE MET WITH AN AGREEMENT ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF LOWER SCALE MANEUVERS ON A BILATERAL AND VOLUNTARY BASIS. OTHERWISE ONLY WAY TO PROCEED WAS TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON INITIAL REALISTIC STEPS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL, AND THEN LATER ON TO TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS BASED ON EXPERIENCE. U.S. REP SAID THAT A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD MIGHT BE THE BEST APPROACH. MENDELEVICH COUNTERED THIS WITH THE REMARK THAT FIGURES DO NOT PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE PICTURE SINCE 20,000 MEN HEAVILY ARMED WOULD BE A MUCH GREATER THREAT THAN 50,000 MEN LIGHTLY ARMED. THUS, AN ARMY CORPS WITH ALL ITS WEAPONS AND PROPER STAFF DIRECTION CONSTITUTED A REAL FORCE DE FRAPPE CAPABLE OF STRIKING A SERIOUS BLOW. AN ARMY CORPS IS A DANGEROUS THING, HE SAID. ANYTHING LESS IS NOT.

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5. MENDELEVICH SAID THAT DURING THE SUMMER BREAK HIS DELEGATION HAD HELD DEEP DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW ON THESE QUESTIONS WITH COMPETENT AUTHORITIES TO DETERMINE IF THE DELEGATION HAD ACTED CORRECTLY IN GENEVA AND NOT IN A NEGATIVE WAY. THE CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE DELEGATION ACTED CORRECTLY IN ADVOCATING THE VIEW THAT CBMS WERE NEW AND UNTRIED, THAT THEY CREATED RISKS AND THAT GREAT CAUTION SHOULD BE TAKEN.

6. COMMENT-MENDELEVICH HAS NOT CHANGED HIS STYLE OR LINE  
OF REASONING ON CBMS.

IT IS CLEAR, AT LEAST INITIALLY, THAT SOVIET  
DEL WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE A HARD LINE ON CBMS AND THAT  
THERE IS NO PRESENT INCLINATION TO MOVE CLOSER TO THE  
WESTERN POSITIONS ON THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION.  
END COMMENT. DALE

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## Message Attributes

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**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
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**Disposition Authority:** kelleyw0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
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